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ABSTRACT
Although there is no common fiscal policy at the European
Union (EU) level in Croatia, accession will entail important changes in
budgetary revenue and expenditure. On the one hand, accession brings
transfers from the EU budget, but also means the loss of customs reve-
nue as well as the need to adjust the structure of tax revenue. On the ot-
her hand, in conjunction with significant expenditure for adjustment in
areas such as transportation and the environment, as well as expenditu-
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res for the EU budget, there will be a change in the structure of expen-
diture, in order to be able to check on transfers from the Structural
Funds. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the intensity and direc-
tion of fiscal effects that accession will lead to, as well as the changes in
their structure and the possibility of meeting the convergence criteria.
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INTRODUCTION
When considering the fiscal effects of enlargement we come
upon a kind of absurdity. This concerns matters that are regularly do-
minant in negotiations about EU accession, although they are actually
negligible in relation to the total costs and benefits of joining. We shall
nevertheless direct our analysis precisely to the fiscal aspects of acce-
ssion, because for a number of reasons we consider them exceptionally
important. First of all, irrespective of the principle according to which
new members should not have to make a net contribution to the EU
budget, it seems that accession will regularly increase fiscal pressure in
new members, even to the extent that there will have to be discussion
of a possible fiscal crisis occasioned by the enlargement. Secondly, new
members will have to run their fiscal policy in line with the principles
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which can also have certain ne-
gative consequences.
In line with this focus, in the first chapter we shall consider the
sum effects of joining on the revenue and expenditure of the Croatian
budget. This kind of harmonisation of the Croatian tax system with EU
guidelines could result in new revenue from excises on mineral oils,
while a reduction of revenue is expected because of payment of some
of the customs duty into the EU budget and also due to the harmonisa-
tion of the customs system. The most important new revenue item will
consist of various transfers from the EU budget, since some of these
transfers, due to the substitution effect, will reduce the expenditures of
the Croatian budget. Nevertheless, some of the transfers, because of the
need to pre-finance and joint finance projects, will increase the expen-
diture side of the budget. A considerable increase in expenditure will
primarily be the consequence of payments into the EU budget, as well
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as of essential investment in the infrastructure and environment areas.
Because of the harmonisation of the system of state aid with the EU ru-
les, considerable fiscal savings can be looked for, although it is impo-
ssible to predict when this could be expected. 
In the next chapter the effects of joining on the handling of fi-
scal policy will be considered, particularly the implementation of the
SGP. First of all, most of the future members still have to reduce their
budgetary deficit considerably so as to harmonise with the fiscal rules
of the EU. After that, since these rules are tailored to the situation of the
current members, from whom the new members will differ in several
factors important for the shaping of macro-economic policy, the new
members will have to adapt a somewhat different approach to the ma-
nagement of fiscal policy so as not to violate the common rules. Finally,
we consider what effects the management of fiscal policy will have on
the dynamics of the public debt in the future members.
We conclude the work with recommendations that, according to
our analysis, might improve the preparation for the handling of fiscal
policy within the context of the EU.
FISCAL EFFECTS OF ACCESSION
Effects on the national budget revenue 
We shall start our analysis of the fiscal effects with an analysis
of revenue that on entry into the EU will inevitably be subject to cer-
tain changes. On the one hand, some of the budgetary revenue, from
VAT and customs duty, will be channelled off by the standard mecha-
nisms into the EU budget, while on the other hand there will potential-
ly be a wide open space for the increase of certain kinds of revenue (li-
ke excises) as a result of the harmonisation of the tax system. As coun-
terbalance to this net drain of resources, there will also be transfers
from the EU budget into our own national budget. However, as we ha-
ve already pointed out, it is a question whether all these trends will ul-
timately have a neutral, positive or negative effect on public finances.
From this point of view, the analysis below will focus on the quantifi-
cation of given effects, to the extent that this is possible.
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Value added tax
We start with an analysis of VAT, a part of which through the
indirect keyi will drain into the EU budget. The task is to evaluate the
revenue from VAT in 2007, and this figure will then, later on in the pa-
per, be used to estimate the amount of the drain into the EU budget. 
In order to estimate the amount of revenue from VAT in 2007
we shall use the knowledge that there is a significant link between VAT
revenue and nominal GDP (EIZG, 2003), according to which for each
1% rise in nominal GDP, VAT revenue rises by 1.2%. From this point
of view, the key is to estimate the growth of GDP in the period up to
2007. Without entering into details about considerations of which GDP
growth rate to use, it seems most correct to use estimates of potential
rates of growth (Mihaljek, 2002) as guidelines, which from 1994 to
mid-2002 came to almost 5%, and to reduce this by one percentage po-
int, in order to get as realistic, or conservative, as possible a projection
of GDP growth. Thus, the assumption is that in the next three to five
year period the Croatian economy might rise on average at a real rate
of 4%, that is at a nominal rate of 7.1%, considering the assumed ave-
rage annual rate of inflation of 3%.ii Considering the assumption stated
concerning the growth of nominal GDP, and the standard ceteris pari-
bus assumption that the VAT system will not change, revenue from
VAT in 2007 can be estimated at 38.4 billion kuna or 15.4% of the
GDP of that time.
Taxes on international trade (customs)
There is a dual loss of revenue from customs. First, there is di-
rect loss according to the key by which 75% of the revenue from cu-
stoms duties is automatically channelled into the EU budget. There is
also an indirect loss, arising because of harmonisation with the EU cu-
stoms tariff structure.
In order to estimate the direct loss, we shall assume that the va-
lue of imports will come to 55% of GDP in 2007,iii and that 80% of thi-
siv import will come from countries with which we have free trade trea-
ties. From this point of view, of the 137 billion kuna value of imports
in 2007, no more than 27.4 billion kuna will be subject to customs du-
ties. Since on accession Croatia will have to take on board the current
EU customs tariff, according to which the average customs rate is
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2.6%, the total revenue of customs duty can most simply be estimated
on the assumption that the current average EU customs rate will not
change.v In this case, it can be estimated that in 2007 a revenue of 712
million might be collected, which means a direct drain of 534 million
kuna (75%) or 0.2% of the then GDP into the EU budget.
Finally, one should bear in mind the additional loss of revenue
from customs duty because of the adoption of the customs tariff struc-
ture of the EU. Considering the current difference between the average
customs rate in the EU and Croatia (2.6% as against 6.3%), the loss that
might come about on this basis in 2007 would be about one billion ku-
na, or 0.4% of GDP.vi It is useful to emphasise once again that this is
money that is simply lost because of the transition to a new customs ta-
riff (part of the harmonisation process), and that this amount has to be
included into the amount of the total loss of revenue from customs duty,
which with this climbs to 0.6% of GDP.
Excises
Unlike VAT and customs duties, excise or special taxes are the
only item on the revenue side that might, as a result of the harmonisa-
tion of some of the rates in line with EU guidelines, increase budget re-
venue. However, it is worth pointing out that there are EU members
that have not totally harmonised their structure of excises,vii which
leads to the conclusion that Croatia then does not at once, on entry in-
to the EU, have to harmonise the whole structure of its excise duties.viii
Harmonisation will have to be carried out in an agreed transition pe-
riod. From this point of view, one should thus talk about the potential
of larger budgetary revenues in 2007.
At the very outset it would be useful to point out that the EU
aims at the harmonisation of three kinds of excise – mineral oils, tobac-
co products and alcohol, and that these three kinds of excise in Croatia
– in terms of both coverage and amount – are already fairly well adju-
sted with those existing in the EU. In essence, harmonisation of the
amount of the excise on alcohol is not at all necessary (Arbutina, Kuliš
and Pitareviæ, 2002), so that on this basis alone no additional revenue
can be anticipated. As for the excise on tobacco products, only a minor
adjustment is required – the raising of the excise on cigarettes expre-
ssed as a percentage of the retail price from the existing 49.1% to 57%
(for the Standard Group). Because of the specific nature of the product
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and the market, as well as of the workings of the black market, we think
that such an increase, if it actually happens, will not entail considerable
additional revenue for the Croatian budget. Thus all that is left is the ex-
cise on mineral oils, which are also the most important from the point
of view of their share in the overall revenue from excise (60%). In
Croatia the excise on unleaded petrol is 12% lower than the EU mini-
mum, and that on diesel fuel 22%. On the other hand, excise on heating
oil is already harmonised and here no additional revenue can be expec-
ted.ix The newly created additional revenue – in the event of the appli-
cation of minimum excises for unleaded and for diesel, and on condi-
tion that the existing excise on heating oil is not changed - would come
to 1 billion kuna in 2007, or 0.4% of the GDP at the time. This would
be the total additional revenue from the harmonisation of excises.
There is also potential additional space for revenue from excise
connected to mineral oil fuel, since in the EU there are also excises on
fuels such as kerosene, natural gas and LPG. From this point of view
we can expect the introduction of new excises on additional products,
and then the restructuring of the amount of excise depending on the
purpose the fuel is used for (for engines, for engines in commercial use,
for heating). Depending on the categories, the same kind of fuel will ha-
ve various excise rates, all for the purpose of meeting the broader tasks
of transportation policy, environment protection policy, agricultural po-
licy, and finally, employment policy. It seems very reasonable, howe-
ver, to assume that the application of such comprehensive policies will
require time, and also to take into consideration only the 1 billion kuna
of additional revenue in 2007 stated above, which is also in a sense po-
tential, in that it assumes the harmonisation of excises on unleaded pe-
trol and diesel fuel.
New kinds of revenue for the national budget
Apart from the effect that joining will have on the existing na-
tional budget revenue (customs duty, VAT, excise), there will be new
categories of revenue that will arise as the consequence of transfers
from the EU budget and as a result of participation in the common po-
licies of the EU. Although these revenues are one of the things that at-
tract new members most, including Croatia, it is necessary to accentua-
te two aspects that diminish the attractiveness of obtaining transfers,
particularly from the standpoint of public finance.
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• Some transfers will not affect the budget, which will serve as a me-
dium for the transfer of these resources to the end users.
• Not all transfers will be exclusively revenue for the budget; some, be-
cause of the principle of joint-financing and pre-financing, will have
an effect on the expenditure side of the budget.
The positive side of obtaining transfers from the EU budget can
be seen in the reduction of expenditure for the financing of existing aid
systems. This is called the substitution effect, since resources from the
EU budget will substitute national financing.
The estimate of the amount of transfers is made more difficult
since their aggregate amount, in the case of Croatia, is determined by a
new financial perspective that will work from 2007 to 2013, the crea-
tion of which will be addressed at the earliest in 2005. In addition, the
amount of transfers will directly depend on the outcome of the actual
accession negotiations and on the direction of reforms in regional and
agricultural policy within the EU.  An additional unknown variable re-
lates to the capacity of Croatia to build up an institutional infrastructu-
re for the administration of EU funds. It is estimated that new members,
that have had more time to set up effective transfer mechanisms than
Croatia will have, will not manage to use all the resources that are avai-
lable to them in the first years of membership. In Croatia, such institu-
tions are still in their infancy.x
Within the framework of these constraints, it would seem oppor-
tune to make use of data for Slovakia and Lithuania from the docu-
ments of the European Commission in which net budgetary items for
the new member states are worked out (see Annex 1). The figures for
Slovakia will be used for the calculation of transfers from the Structu-
ral Funds, since those to the greatest extent depend on the size of the
population (Slovak population is 5.4 million, Croatian 4.3) and GDP
(Slovakia has a GDP of 23.7 billion dollars, and Croatia 22.4). In the
case of transfers from agricultural funds, we shall make use of the data
for Lithuania, because they depend to a great extent on the total popu-
lation (which in Lithuania is 3.5 million), the share of agriculture in
GDP (7.2% in Lithuania and 9.7% in Croatia (World Bank, 2003)), and
on the structure of the farm sector (in both countries there are a large
number of small, unconsolidated farms, because of which they have the
same structural problems). Although the results obtained in this manner
cannot be completely accurate, they will nevertheless make possible a
review of the order of magnitude and the direction of effects of joining
on the Croatian budget.
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Transfers from the EU budget can be divided into (1) those that
are not related to projects and hence their sums automatically become
budget revenue and (2) those that depend on projects, while the inflow
depends on the power of Croatia to absorb it, i.e., to what extent pro-
jects at state and local level will be co-financed from the budget. Direct
income supports, market intervention in agriculture and internal politics
transfers fall into the first group. The second group includes transfers
from the Structural Funds, the cohesion fund and resources for rural de-
velopment. There is also a third group of revenues that include the re-
mains of the pre-accession assistance, special arrangements and budge-
tary compensations. As can be seen from Annexe 1, in the first year of
membership transfers will be at a fairly low level because of the inabi-
lity of new members to absorb all the resources, on account of their own
economic, administrative and institutional underdevelopment.
Transfers unrelated to individual projects 
The first group of transfers unrelated to individual projects com-
prises direct income support to farmers and market interventions. Both
kinds of transfer come from the agricultural fund, or more accurately,
from its guarantee-related part.
In the most recent accession negotiations it was agreed that in
the first year of membership income support would be paid only in the
amount of 25% of total support that is obtained by EU members, with
the proviso that this amount would gradually rise until in 2013 it reac-
hed 100%.xi If we assume that in the next round of enlargement the sa-
me principle will hold, in 2007 Croatia too will get 25% of the aid. The
very nature of financing income support also tends to the detriment of
new members. That is, income support payments arrive about three
months late, which always shifts the payment into the following fiscal
year, so that the amounts earmarked for 2007 will in fact only be paid
in 2008 (the liquidity gap or the so-called Green Hole effect).xii Since
this paper is concentrated only on fiscal effects, in 2007 we can conc-
lude that revenue from the EU budget will be zero, but that a very con-
siderable amount will be shown on the expenditure side. Taking the da-
ta for Lithuania, the total liquidity gap in 2007 might come to 590 mil-
lion kuna. This expenditure will be reduced in the very next year, but
there will not be any positive effects on the budget since the support is
meant for the end beneficiaries - the farmers - and the budget will be
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used only as a transfer instrument. Still, there will be positive effects on
the budget, and as early as 2007. That is, already in the budget for 2003
the Agriculture Ministry has earmarked 350 million kuna for income
support, and since this instrument was introduced only this year, it can
be expected that the sum will have risen by 2007.  Because of the sub-
stitution effect, the Croatian budget will save this small amount.xiii
Transfers on the basis of market support also come late, and
about 205 million kuna of expenditure could be expected in the 2007
budget for pre-financing. Still, the budget will once again have savings
because of the substitution effect in the amount of these 205 million ku-
na, since EU resources will cover the support part of the budget and free
these resources for other purposes. Also, since with entry into the EU
Croatia will have to accept the principles of the CAP, other aid meant
for market intervention will have to be abolished.
Transfers on the basis of internal politics, which are mainly used
for the financing of existing policies, institutional upgrading and the
establishment of quality border controls with third countries constitute
the second group of transfers. Since most transfers are calculated accor-
ding to the share in the total population and GDP of the EU, for the ap-
proximate calculation of the amount that Croatia will receive on this ba-
sis we shall use the example of Slovakia again. These transfers will be
exclusively the revenue of the national budget, since they will either re-
place or complement national financing, and they might amount to abo-
ut 354 million kuna.
Transfers related to individual projects
Project-related transfers require joint financing. For this reason,
in the past there have been cases of member states even refusing this
kind of aid since they were not able to bear the burden. Transfers from
the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and resources for rural deve-
lopment come into this group.
The national budget bears from 25 to 50% of the costs of finan-
cing projects from the Structural Funds, the typical percentage being
25%. Resources from the Structural Funds represent additional finan-
cing, as it is called, which means that the resources of the funds may
not be a substitute for financing from national sources. Countries have
to keep financing at least at the level they used to in the period before
they obtained these resources. Hence, the use of these resources, de-
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pends on the power of absorption of each member state, and the reso-
urces that are allocated to the new members may not exceed 4% of their
GDP.xiv Because of the requirement for joint financing, the real inflow
of resources in the first year of membership is lower by about 25%.
On the basis of the Slovak data, Croatian regions (units of local
government and self-government) might in 2007 get 779 million kuna,
and the budget would have to find another 253 million. Some of these
resources will be distributed to institutions outside general government
(e.g. to privately owned firms), which means that in these cases, these
institutions will have to bear the costs of joint financing. Since it is at
present impossible to predict which part of the structure funds will fi-
nance projects in the private sector, for the sake of simplicity of calcu-
lation we shall assume that all these resources will enter the budget of
general government.
Resources from the Cohesion Fund are meant for the financing
of infrastructure and environment in member states whose GDP is less
than 90% of the EU average. According to data for Slovakia, in 2007
Croatia can expect 31 million kuna of direct revenue for the budget.
Since taking part in projects financed by the Cohesion Fund comes to
between 80 and 85% of total costs, the burden of joint financing would
be only 5.4 million kuna.
The third source of revenue and costs for the national budget
will be resources for rural development. The level of joint financing
amounts to 20%, so that Croatia, again on the basis of data from Lithua-
nia, could get 438 million in 2007, and the budget would have to add
another 110 million. Although these funds are meant for the ultimate
beneficiaries, farmers, there will still be positive effects for the budget,
since transfers from the budget will replace national financing of rural
development. Since we have data only for 2003 (60 million kuna is ear-
marked for rural development) we can predict that, due to the substitu-
tion effect, savings will come to a minimum of 60 million kuna.
Other revenue
Other revenue includes pre-accession assistance, which will
continue to flow into the budget because of its nature even after joining
the EU, special cash-flow facilities and interim budgetary compensa-
tions. These transfers will be the direct revenue of the national budget
and will not require co-financing.
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Although it can be expected that Croatia, when it becomes a full
candidate, will obtain pre-accession assistance from the programme in
which other candidates take part, for now it is hard to guess how much
these resources will amount to, since comparison with any other co-
untry is impossible without in-depth analysis. For this reason, we will
keep to the conservative approach and assume that Croatia will keep on
getting only the resources from CARDS, with the same dynamics as to
date, about 450 million kuna p.a.
Special cash flow facilities are meant to neutralise the negative
effects of joining during the first years of membership. The key accor-
ding to which these resources are allocated is not universal, and the exi-
sting distribution was the result more of good or bad negotiating posi-
tions in Copenhagen than of real factors. For Croatia, we have taken the
example of Slovakia, which means that the inflow into the budget co-
uld be 558 million kuna.
Temporary budgetary compensations relate entirely to members
that would be net contributors to the budget of the EU. It would be po-
litically unacceptable to put new members, whose GDP is much below
the EU average, into the position of financing the budget of the EU. In
order to avoid this kind of situation, additional resources were alloca-
ted to Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Malta.  Since we can assu-
me that Croatia will not get into the situation of being a net contributor
we shall consider this potential revenue to be zero.
Effects on expenditure of the national budget
When Croatia enters the EU, the national budget will experien-
ce a number of serious shocks. The first will be the joint financing and
pre-financing of transfers from the EU budget, and the second, the big-
ger shock, will relate to payments into the EU budget. If one can judge
from the last wave of enlargement that takes place in the countries of
Eastern Europe and the Baltic, Croatia will have to pay into the budget
of the EU from the moment it becomes a member.
Payments into the European Union budget
The distinguishing feature of the EU as international organisa-
tion is that it has a budget that is financed from what is called its own
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revenue. This includes revenue from customs duties and sugar imports,
revenue deriving from VAT and revenue from the GNI.xv
Since customs duties and the revenue that on the basis of cu-
stoms duties will be channelled into the EU budget were treated in the
previous chapter, this chapter will concentrate on payments deriving
from VAT and GNI.
Payments deriving from VAT are calculated as a certain percen-
tage of the base of VAT (which cannot exceed 50% of GDP). Since the
Croatian VAT system is almost totally harmonised with European stan-
dards, on the basis of the estimate of the base for VAT for 2007, we can
estimate that Croatia will have to pay in an amount of 338 million kuna.
Payments deriving from GNI will be the biggest burden for the
national budget. The total revenue of the EU budget on the basis of GNI
is calculated as the difference between total EU budgetary expenditure
and revenue collected on other bases. In other words, this revenue patc-
hes holes in the budget and every member state pays in its own part on
the basis of the size of GNI. On the basis of the estimate of GNI (GDP)
for 2007, the total amount that Croatia would have to pay comes to 1.9
billion kuna.
An additional expense to the budget will be the UK rebate. Af-
ter joining the EU the UK became the biggest contributor to the budget,
mostly thanks to the low level of transfers from the CAP due to its re-
latively small agricultural sector. For this reason, in Fontainebleau in
1984 Margaret Thatcher won the right for the UK to get refunded part
of its payment into the budget in the amount of 0.66% of its net posi-
tion. The loss of this revenue is made up together by the other member
states, with the proviso that Germany, Holland, Austria and Sweden
(the largest net contributors) bear only one quarter share. The drain in-
to the budget of the EU on the basis of this could be 177 million kuna.
Other payments
Although payments into the budget of the EU are by far the big-
gest payments that the Croatian budget will have to bear, it is also ne-
cessary to mention contributions to EU institutions in which Croatia
will have to participate from the very beginning of its membership.
This relates to the ECB and to the EIB – European Central and Inve-
stment Banks.
Since in 2007 Croatia will not enter the EMU – it will need at
least two or two and a half years more – the obligation to pay for
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membership in the ECB will come to only 5% of its capital share,
which amounts to 5 billion euro. The calculation is based on the sha-
re of Croatia in the total population and of the total GDP in the EU.
During this calculation, data for Romania and Bulgaria have been
used, since the next enlargement, in our model, includes those coun-
tries too. The total costs of membership could come to 10.5 million
kuna. It has to be pointed out that this payment will be one-off, and
that the cost of subscribing to the capital of the ECB will be borne by
the CNB, which means that it will not have immediate effects on the
budget.
Payment of membership in the EIB consists of two parts. The
first relates to that part of the paid up capital that the countries have
to pay in, while the other is based on the obligation to cover EIB re-
serves. New members subscribe only 5% of their share, in eight equal
annual instalments. Since the amounts are based on GDP and popula-
tion, on the basis of the Slovak case we can assume that the member-
ship fee for the EIB should be about 75 million kuna.
Finally, on the expenditure side of the budget, costs could va-
ult over 3 billion, or 1.2% of GDP, only as a result of payments into
the EU budget and the EIB.
Table 1 Payments into the European Union budget for 2007
In million % of 
kuna GDP
EU Budget
Customs duties 534 0.21
VAT 338 0.14
GNI 1,900 0.76
UK rebate 177 0.07
EIB 75 0.03
TOTAL 3,024 1.21
Source: Calculation of the authors
State aid
Croatia will also have to harmonise its state aid system with the
current system in the EU. The obligation to harmonise began at the start
of 2002, when the Interim part of the SAA came into force. According
to EU definition, state aid is aid that distorts or threatens to distort com-
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petition by giving advantages to certain producers or products and in
this way affects international trade between the member countries. The
harmonisation of state aid systems actually means a gradual abolition
of discriminatory or sectoral aids and reliance on horizontal aid that fa-
vours no product or producer in particular and the gradual introduction
of the principle of transparency into the system of allocating aid.  
According to estimates of the Institute for Public Finance (Ke-
sner-Škreb, Pleše and Mikiæ, 2003), state aid in Croatia comes to 5.25%
of GDP, while in the EU it comes to only 1% of GDP. Although accor-
ding to these data it can be hypothesized that the final harmonisation
with the EU will bring savings to the Croatian budget to the tune of 4%
of GDP, it is hard to estimate the effect in the budget for 2007 itself.
The harmonisation process is long in the making and expenditure for it
will be diminished gradually. According to the SAA, until the begin-
ning of 2006 Croatia will have to draw up a comprehensive list of aid
programmes and then harmonise these with European criteria, which
means that a large part will have to be harmonised by 2006. It is also
possible that Croatia will manage to negotiate a transition period for the
lifting of state aid and so shift the effects to some later years. Since wit-
hout a more detailed analysis exceeding the constraints of this paper it
is not possible to arrive at more exact figures during the calculation of
the effects of Croatia’s joining the EU on the budget, we shall not take
them into consideration.
Expenditure for adjustments related to infrastructure
and the environment
In this sphere, adjustment to EU standards will constitute a con-
siderable burden on the budget, an expenditure that will be drawn out
over a considerable number of years. The best guide for an estimate of
the expenditures for adjustments in the sphere of infrastructure and the
environment in 2007 will be the experience of new members. But this
experience does not yet exist; hence, the only thing left for us to do is
to rely on existing studies and expert papers that comment on the area.
There is no real knowledge about how much the existing inf-
rastructure in the accession countries, or in Croatia, is adequate (from
the point of view of quality and quantity). In addition, this matter is ren-
dered more complex because all the costs of the adjustment will not be
financed by the government, i.e., by the budget. Instead, a certain amo-
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unt of costs can be financed from private sources. This can come out
particularly in two large and essential infrastructure sections – energy
and transport (see World Bank, 2003). Still, there are some indications
that speak in favour of candidate countries (see EBRD, 2002). In addi-
tion, there is a well-grounded idea that candidate countries as a group
do not have the problem of underinvestment in the infrastructure (Bac-
ke, 2002) and that the key to adjustment does not lie in increasing ca-
pital expenditure as compared with GDP, but rather in increasing the
effectiveness of existing funds (Funck, 2002). If we attempt to include
Croatia into this picture, then measured by capital expenditure, Croatia
is right at the top as compared with other candidate countries.xvi From
this point of view, it is realistic to suppose that actual entry into the EU
will not exact additional expenditures on the infrastructure, but will cer-
tainly require its restructuring at the expense of more profitable inve-
stment in the infrastructure.
With respect to expenditures on the environment, there are certain
calculations (World Bank, 2003) for Croatia that estimate the total nece-
ssary capital expenditure on the environment (for the sake of harmonisa-
tion). According to these calculations, the necessary capital expenditures
range between 6.1 and 11.8 billion euro.xvii It is important to stress that
these expenditures imply total, i.e., both private and public, investments.
Assuming that these costs or investments will be realised according to the
dynamics and the profile of the parameters of Poland,xviii then in the first
year public expenditure (budget expenditure) will come to 76 million eu-
ros (in the rapid implementation of reforms scenario) or 233 million eu-
ros (in the slow implementation of reforms scenario). This study of the
World Bank says that in 1999 in the Croatian budget some 35 million eu-
ro was spent on the environment (last available information). Assuming
that the same amount continues to be spent, this means that in 2007 it will
be necessary to increase the expenditure of the budget by at least 40 mil-
lion euros (or 0.1% of the GDP of that time).xix
Aggregate effects of Croatian membership
in the European Union
The expected net costs of Croatia’s accession to the EU might in
2007, perhaps the first year of membership, come to more than 2.5 bil-
lion kuna, or about 1% of GDP in 2007.
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Table 2 Effects of European Union membership on the general government
budget in 2007
In million % of 
kuna GDP
REVENUE SIDE OF THE BUDGET
1. Transfers unrelated to projects
1.1. Income supports
Liquidity gap -590 -0.24
Substitution effect 371 0.15
1.2. Market supports
Liquidity gap -205 -0.08
Substitution effect 205 0.08
1.3. Internal politics
Revenues 354 0.14
2. Transfers related to projects
2.1. Structural funds
Revenues 779 0.31
Joint financing -261 -0.10
2.2. Cohesion Fund
Revenues 31 0.01
Joint financing -5.4 -0.002
2.3. Rural development
Substitution effect 71 0.03
Joint financing -110 -0.04
3. Other transfers
3.1. Pre-accession assistance 478 0.19
3.2. Special arrangements 558 0.22
3.3. Budgetary compensation 0
TOTAL REVENUE 1,676 0.67
EXPENDITURE SIDE OF THE BUDGET
1. Payments into the EU budget and EIB
1.1. Payments into EU budget
Customs -534 -0.21
VAT -338 -0.14
GNI -1,900 -0.76
UK rebate -177 -0.07
1.2. EIB -75 -0.03
TOTAL PAYMENTS -3,024 -1.21
2. Harmonisation expenditure
2.1. Customs tariff harmonisation -996 0.40
2.2. Environment -300 -0.12
Total harmonisation expenditure -1,296 -0.52
TOTAL EXPENDITURE -4,320 -1.74
NET LOSS TO THE BUDGET -2,644 -1.06
Source: Authors’ calculations
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BUSINESS CYCLES, FISCAL RULES
AND PUBLIC DEBT
In conjunction with the effects on the revenues and expenditures
of the budget, joining the EU will also lead to changes in the way in
which fiscal policy is handled. The EU and the EMU are commonly seen
as creations in which monetary policy is centralised or subject to hard
rules, while fiscal policy is the opposite, that is, an instrument of auto-
nomous national economic policy. However, although the EU budget is
negligible as compared with the budgets of member states, fiscal policy
has actually turned into an instrument of economic policy at the level of
the whole Union. In practice, member countries come up against very
tight constraints in the formulation of fiscal policies, so that a very high
degree of coordination among them has already been attained.
Variables such as average level of inflation or the value of the
euro in terms of other currencies have become a common asset in the
EMU, hence every national policy that affects these variables can lead
to an ECB reaction, and consequently, to changes in the environment
for all the member states. Also, rules with respect to running fiscal po-
licy have been introduced because of the dangers of a spill-over of ef-
fects of risk growth from one of the EU members as a result of irrespon-
sible fiscal policy. Finally, although it is explicitly banned for the ECB
to directly buy bonds of any of the member countries, there is always a
danger that a panic reaction on the financial markets will lead to mone-
tary instability in the whole EMU area.
Fiscal rules in the European Union
Getting the balance of the budget of general consolidated go-
vernment close to equilibrium or into a small surplus is the main aim of
each member country. Balancing the budget relates to its structural ba-
lance, while the cyclical component of the budget can be adjusted de-
pending on the state of the economic cycle, which makes possible the
working of automatic stabilisers.xx In addition to balancing the structu-
ral budget, the largest deficit of the budget of general consolidated go-
vernment is limited to 3% of GDP. In emergency situations, which are
defined as a reduction of GDP by more than 2 percentage points, the re-
sort to sanctions laid down by the SGP is automatically suspended.
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The SGP imposed constraints are stated in such a way that they
allow for the working of automatic stabilisers in the case of the normal
cyclical fluctuations. In the definition of the restrictions, attention was
paid to the potential rate of growth of the economies, fluctuations in
growth and sensitivity of the budgetary balance to cyclical movements. 
The potential rate of growth in member countries is about 2.5%,
while in the case of a reduction of the growth rate by 1% below the po-
tential on average there is a cyclical budgetary deficit of 0.6% of GDP.
Since the average largest output gap recorded in the member countries
during the period from 1960 to 1997 was 4%, which corresponded to a
1.5% reduction of GDP, appeals to extraordinary circumstances in the
context of the SGP should be a rarity (European Commission, 1999). Of
course, fluctuations in GDP are not the same in all the countries, and the
automatic stabilisers do not react equally strongly because of differen-
ces in the structure of revenue and expenditure. For this reason those co-
untries that are exposed to greater shocks and that have more powerful
automatic stabilisers, or that wish to back them up with active counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, must aim at higher budgetary surpluses.
Fiscal constraints from the SGP also enable the stabilisation of
the level of public debt. Thus an average budgetary deficit at the level
of 3% of GDP, with an expected 5% growth rate of nominal GDP,xxi is
in line with the maintenance of public debt at a level of 60% of GDP.
This level of public debt is also prescribed by the SGP as the highest
permissible level of public debt that all members with a higher public
debt should aim at. Since the SGP nevertheless prescribes the balancing
of public finances, in the event of achievement of it, in the mid-term re-
duced levels of public indebtedness should be expected (Mathieu and
Sterdyniak, 2003).
Effects of fiscal rules on future members
Immediately on joining the EU new members assume all obliga-
tions laid down by the SGP. For this reason, accession countries and
candidates usually take part in a pre-accession fiscal surveillance pro-
cedure in order to prepare as well as possible for the obligations that
membership will entail with regard to running macroeconomic policy,
within the context of which they do not have any formal obligations ex-
cept to inform the EU of their economic policy and establish communi-
cation channels. Of course, after entry into the EU, before joining the
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EMU, which is actually obligatory for new members after they have
met the Maastricht criteria,xxii provisions regarding sanctions for not
fulfilling the SGP do not apply to new members. Although they will not
be exposed to financial penalties, they will be under very strong pressu-
re to start running their fiscal policy in line with common rules.
Figure 1 Rate of GDP growth and budget balance in the accession countries,
candidates and Croatia (2002)
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If the degree of fiscal adjustment in Croatia is compared with
that in the accession and candidate countries, it can be concluded that
the situation is not all that bad.xxiii Only Estonia had a budgetary sur-
plus, and a total of half of the twelve countries met the 3% deficit limit,
although in 2002 GDP did not fall in a single country. In Croatia the de-
ficit was 0.9% worse than the average, but the growth rate was 1.4%
higher than the average, which came to 3.8%, and this should also be
taken into account when assessing the differences in the structural de-
ficit. In addition, all the countries with worse indicators with respect to
budgetary deficit also had lower rates of growth than Croatia. Accor-
ding to these indicators, we can conclude that Croatia, like most of the
transition countries, is only coming up to the process of fiscal consoli-
dation. Hence, considering the rate of growth that can be expected in
the mid-term, probably a little lower than the current rate, in Croatia the
budgetary deficit should be reduced by about 6% of GDP, so as to en-
sure a structurally balanced budget.
We have already mentioned that the effects of the SGP on the fi-
scal policy of each member depend essentially on its characteristics.
Future members, like Croatia, differ in several important features from
the current members. Firstly, these countries are much poorer than the
current members and they possess a considerable potential for real con-
vergence. In this paper we have assumed the potential rate of real
growth for Croatia to be 4%. Secondly, because of the level of prices
that is about half the EU average, nominal convergence brought about
by the Balassa-Samuleson effect and a growth of the level of admini-
strative prices can be expected. This will make the differences in rates
of nominal growth, which is essential for the dynamics of public debt,
still greater than the difference in the rates of real growth. Also, the le-
vels of public revenue and expenditure in the future members, inclu-
ding Croatia, irrespective of the lower level of development attained,
are not essentially below the revenues and expenditures of the current
members. This means that the automatic stabilisers should not be any
weaker than in the present members. However, the future members ha-
ve a relatively unfavourable structure of expenditure, with a high pro-
portion of fixed expenditures, like pensions and healthcare expenses,
which do not change depending on the state of the business cycle (Rich-
ter and Römisch, 2003). Although it would seem that because of the
weaker automatic stabilisers the new members will not be confronted
with the appearance of impermissible deficits, they will actually have
to depend even more on an active fiscal policy in order to stabilise the
economy. This has proved dangerous to date in their case because after
the end of the recession the cyclical deficits gradually turned into struc-
tural deficits (Kopits and Székely, 2003). Finally, future members, inc-
luding Croatia, are on the whole smaller and more open than the pre-
sent members. This means that fluctuations of production will be grea-
ter in their case, as will the need for the concomitant stabilisation,
which can bring about greater cyclical deficits during some periods
than those common with the old members.
All these features could well have a negative effect on the effi-
ciency of fiscal policy in Croatia and in some other transition countries
within the framework of the SGP. For example, for Croatia, because of
its relatively high potential rate of growth, the sanctions provided for in
the SGP would be suspended only in the case of a reduced rate of
growth of GDP by 6 percentage points below the potential, while for
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member countries this reduction comes on the average only to 4.5 per-
centage points. For this reason, Croatia will have to make a stronger ef-
fort toward fiscal adjustment if it wants to retain flexibility of fiscal po-
licy. Furthermore, automatic stabilisers constitute a special problem. In
Croatia at the moment we have no understanding of the structural ba-
lance of the budget or of the working of automatic stabilisers, because
of which we are unable to say whether they will suffice to stabilise the
economy, or in what way the budget balance will react to a change in
the rate of growth. If it is concluded that automatic stabilisers are too
weak to bring the economy into balance, of which there are already in-
dications, it would be good to think about ways of preparing an active
fiscal policy to respond fast and effectively to the state of the economy,
that is, how the budget deficit could be simply increased or reduced in
the current year.
Also relatively unfavourable are the consequences that EU fiscal
rules will have on the level of public debt of new members in the event
of the strict application of the SGP. Because of the essentially higher po-
tential rate of growth of nominal GDP, bringing the structural budget in-
to balance will rapidly reduce their public debt. While for EU countries
with a structural deficit of the budget at the level of 3% one can expect
an equilibrium level of public debt at 60% of GDP, for transition coun-
tries, assuming a nominal rate of growth of 7% and an identical start le-
vel for public debt, their convergence on 43% of GDP can be expected.
In addition, in the case of a structural imbalance of the budget, in the
new members it is possible to expect a much more rapid reduction of the
ratio of public debt and GDP. In case of the initial assumptions concer-
ning growth and level of indebtedness, new members could halve this
ratio in some ten years. This means that new members, which because
of the high expected rates of growth have a greater capacity to take on
debt and a larger need for infrastructure investments, will in fact be for-
ced into a more rapid reduction of public debt.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Government has made fiscal projections up to 2007, by
which time we assume that with a bit of luck Croatia might enter the
EU. According to Government’s projects, the deficit of the budget of
general consolidated government might by that year be reduced to 2%
of GDP.xxiv However, the actual fact that Croatia will have greater net
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transfers from the EU budget than payments into the budget does not
necessarily mean that joining will not entail additional costs for the
Croatian budget. Our estimates say that in 2007 we might expect nega-
tive fiscal effects of accession in a total amount of about 1% of the an-
ticipated BDP. Of course, the reserve of potential savings through the
reduction of state aid should also be kept in mind, which might be con-
siderable, although its dynamics would be hard to predict in that year.
Additional difficulties derive from the framework of the SGP for
running fiscal policy. The possibility of running an anti-cyclical fiscal
policy in line with these rules will not be retained with a structural de-
ficit of the budget of 2% of GDP, as the Government’s projections look
for, or even 3% of GDP, if we count on the potential fiscal effects of jo-
ining. In connection with this, certain recommendations as to how to
prepare fiscal policy for the challenges of EU membership might be
drawn from the paper:
• As soon as possible it is necessary to realistically assess the structural
balance of the budget, and also the effect of the automatic stabilisers
on the budgetary balance.
• If the automatic stabilisers are judged to be inadequate to stabilise the
economy, which is likely because of the structure of budgetary reve-
nues and expenditure, it will be necessary to develop a fiscal activism
policy capable of rapidly and flexibly increasing and decreasing the
budgetary deficit in line with the movements of the business cycle.
• According to an assessment of the structural balance of the budget and
the strength of the automatic stabilisers, or the expected degree of fi-
scal activism, it is necessary to draw up a projection of fiscal adju-
stment to facilitate the running of an anti-cyclical fiscal policy that
does not involve infringements of the SGP. Because of a rate of po-
tential growth higher than that of current members, Croatia would
very likely have to create a structural surplus so that the automatic sta-
bilisers could act without exposing Croatia to possible sanctions in the
case of a deeper recession.
It is important to realise that all these recommendations lend for-
ce to the already routine steps that the European Commission takes
when estimating the harmonisation of each country with the SGP. In
addition, they are a necessary part of the consideration of each of the
candidates of the EU as it prepares to join the EU. On its way to mem-
bership in the EU Croatia will certainly meet the necessity of carrying
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out all these steps. However, we think that these steps should be taken
as soon as possible because of the long period in which fiscal adju-
stment is usually made, and the shortness of the time span in which
Croatia plans to become an EU member. Finally, we are of the opinion
that current plans for fiscal adjustment do not lead to a completely ef-
ficient policy within the context of the EU.
i There is an intermediate key according to which a certain percentage of revenue
from VAT is paid into the EU budget.
ii Inflation of 3% is not essentially greater than the indirectly targeted inflation of the
EU, and yet also allows space for adjustment of relative prices in the remaining pro-
tected sectors, and the working of the Balassa-Samuelson effect (which comes out
particularly in the transition countries with an intensive growth of productivity). We
recall that the Balassa-Samuelson effect arises when growth of productivity within
a sector of internationally marketable goods rises faster than the rate of production
within the sector of international non-marketable goods, which in turn assuming
mobility of labour brings about a wage cost rise, and then of prices in the interna-
tionally non-marketable goods sector.
iii This is a negligibly greater value than the average value if the 2000-2002 period is
taken into consideration. Actually, for a considerable number of years, the value of
imports has come to between 50 and 60% of GDP.
iv The value of the proportion of imports in GDP from countries with which Croatia
has made free trade agreements has remained unchanged (about 80%) irrespective
of the making of these treaties. For this reason, it can be assumed that these shares
will not change in the new future either, i.e., there will not be any significant effect
of changes in trading.
v There are good reasons for expecting a reduction of the rate in the next four years
(the EU is negotiating with several countries about free trade) but since we can only
guess how much this might come to in the end, it seems most appropriate to work
with the current rate, 2.6%.
vi The loss might be even greater, depending on the deepening of the difference
between the average customs rate in the EU and here (see note 5 above).
vii Interesting here is Kischel’s (2003) finding, which recalls that the harmonisation of
excises on mineral oils, tobacco and alcohol in the EU started as long ago as 1972,
and is still not complete.
viii Here it is perhaps more correct to speak of the amount of individual excises rather
than of structure, because different countries can have different excises; yet what is
essential is that the amount of the excises for agreed-on kinds (mineral oils and
fuels, tobacco and alcohol) is harmonised among the member countries.
ix European Parliament Fact Sheets, ch. 3.4.7 The Taxation of Energy.
x It is expected that the administration of the EU funds will be done by the newly-
founded Fund for Regional Development (at the current time this has only 7 employ-
ees) and the Fund for the Development of Employment (4 staff members) and spe-
cialised agencies whose organisation is earmarked for the future.
xi This principle has been the subject of great debates since it directly disrupts com-
petition in the farm sector. The reasons for the introduction of such a discriminato-
ry regime for new member states lies in the great expense of farm policy (the budg-
et would be faced with great expenditures if new member states that have a much
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greater farm sector were to be paid the same support as old members without
reform of their agricultural policy), and in claims that new members are incapable
of making use of greater transfers.
xii Income support is paid from the national budget in October, while resources from
the EU budget arrive only in January.
xiii If we assume that Croatia will not make use of the possibility of cofinancing income
support in the first years of membership. 
xiv Estimate of absorption power made on the basis of data for existing member states
(Mayhew, 2003).
xv GNI includes all the income of residents, irrespective of whether it is made inside
the country or abroad. Since Croatian GNI from 1997 to 2002 on average differs
from GDP only by 0.2%, we can use the already calculated projection of GDP for
2007 for the same period.
xvi In 2002 6.3% of GDP was earmarked from the budget for capital expenditures. This
is well above the value for other countries (candidates), which earmark from 2.3 to
5%. Here, however, it would be important to point out that any relevant analysis
should take into account a longer number of years, and in our case exclude capital
expenditure for reconstruction, which is a distinctive feature of the Croatian case. 
xvii The span of the estimate is broad, because of the uncertainty with respect to unit
costs and of the uncertainty of the effectiveness of investment strategies.
xviii About 40% of total expenditure will be done in the first 6 years, and of this 30% will
be financed by the government, 60% by the private sector and 10% by external
resources.
xix Total expenditure (private and public) will have to be increased by at least 200 mil-
lion euro (about 0.6% of GDP).
xx The work of automatic stabilisers implies the automatic increase or reduction of
revenue and expenditure of the budget depending on the phase of the economic
cycle (and not on changes in tax regulations and/or discretionary changes in expen-
diture).
xxi Expected rate of growth of nominal GDP is more or less the same as the sum of the
potential rate of real growth and the rate of inflation. The ECB has adopted a rate,
as unofficial rate of inflation, that is lower than 2%, but it is close to this level, so
that the rate of nominal growth in the EU will probably be a little lower than 5%,
though not much.
xxii Like Denmark and the UK, which have the right of derogation, so far Sweden has
not introduced the euro, which does not have this right, because it joined in the last
round of enlargement, but so far it has avoided the introduction of the euro by refus-
ing to join in the ERM-2 exchange mechanism. This means that those transition
countries that really want to, will probably be able to put off joining in the EMU, as
well as the implementation of the SGP in its entirety.
xxiii Turkey is excepted from the comparison because of the recent financial crisis and
the uncertain future vis-à-vis European integration.
xxiv Session of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, September 1, 2003.
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